

Exploring the Interplay of Empathy and Moral Reasoning through a Social Domain Approach

Hwang, Jeong-Yeon

Pontifical Gregorian University, Professor of Psychology

Introduction

1. Definitions of Empathy and Empathy-Related Emotions

1.1. Empathy, Sympathy, and Empathic Concern

1.2. Self-Centered Empathetic Reactions

2. Empathy and Altruism

2.1. Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

2.2. Proof for Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

3. Empathy and Cognition

3.1. Empathy-Related Reasoning

3.2. Cognitive Antecedents of Empathy

4. Theoretical Formulations for the Study on Emotions in Moral Judgments

4.1. Relationship between Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgments

4.2. Definition of Morality in Studies on Empathy

4.3. Coordination of Domains in Decision-Making for Prosocial Actions

Conclusion

Introduction

Empathy plays a central role in social interactions, particularly in its relation to moral reasoning and positive emotions such as sympathy and compassion. This article provides a thorough review and analysis of psychological studies on empathy, examining them through the lens of Elliot Turiel's social domain theory.¹⁾ Turiel's work revolutionized the study of moral judgments by demonstrating that children construct moral, conventional, and personal domains through interactions with others: These domains represent distinct systems of thought in human social interactions.²⁾

Moral judgments extend beyond societal norms to consider well-being, fair distribution of resources, and human rights. In the conventional domain, decisions are made based on established rules and obedience to authority, encompassing social interactions and cultural practices. Decisions in the personal domain reflect individual preferences, for example in leisure or clothing choices.³⁾ These domains have been implicitly used since childhood and intricately shape thoughts and judgments. The coordination of domains illustrates how individuals navigate complex situations.⁴⁾ The social domain approach, which has a strong philosophical foundation and extensive empirical evidence, is proving to be a powerful tool for exploring the interplay between empathy and reasoning.

Empirical studies of empathy, moral reasoning, and prosocial behavior underscore the need to strengthen theoretical foundations. Turiel suggests that judgments in the moral domain are closely linked to emotions,⁵⁾ challenging the artificial dichotomy imposed

1) Elliot Turiel, *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

2) Refer to Turiel; Jeong Yeon Hwang, *How Do Humans Become Moral? Social Domain Approach to Moral Development* (Amazon Kindle Direct Publishing, 2021).

3) Refer to Hwang, *How Do Humans Become Moral?*, 65-71, 89-92.

4) Judith G. Smetana, "Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistency and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgements," in *Handbook of Moral Development*, ed. M. Killen and J. G. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006), 119-53.

5) Elliot Turiel, "Thought, Emotions, Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development," In *Handbook of Moral Development*, ed. M. Killen and J. G. Smetana (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006), 7-35.

by psychologists and neuroscientists who categorize human decisions as either emotional or rational.⁶⁾ Given that decision-making inherently involves both cognitive and emotional components, an exploration of how Piaget's perspective supports their inseparability will provide valuable insights into the design and interpretation of empathy studies.⁷⁾

Scholars such as Hoffman emphasize the importance of internalizing social norms in children's moral development,⁸⁾ while Turiel proposes that children make moral judgments based on considerations of harm, welfare, justice, and rights independent of social norms. Turiel's and his colleagues' research on children's moral judgments at different ages provides ample evidence that children form moral reasoning patterns based on their understanding of these concepts, rather than simply adhering to authoritative dictates.⁹⁾ This calls for a shift from the internalization to the social domain approach to morality, with a focus on understanding how children autonomously shape their moral judgments.

The study of empathy and prosocial behavior can be enhanced by the integration of Turiel's idea of domain coordination into social reasoning.¹⁰⁾ This approach addresses real-world complexities and provides a systematic understanding of the nuanced decision-making process for prosocial behavior. Particularly when empathic concerns coexist with other considerations, this approach helps researchers categorize different reasoning domains and different concerns. It facilitates the study of how individuals

6) Joshua D. Greene et al., "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment," *Science* 293, no. 5537 (2001): 2105-8; Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.," *Psychological Review* 108, no. 4 (2001): 814-34, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814>.

7) Jean Piaget, *Intelligence and Affect: Their Relationship during Child Development* (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 1981).

8) Martin L. Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

9) Elliot Turiel, "Moral Judgments and Actions: Development and Processes of Coordination," in *Handbook of Moral Development*, ed. M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 3rd ed. (New York London: Routledge, 2022), 3-18.

10) Turiel.

compare and integrate these different domains and concerns to reach a conclusion. The discussion will explore the importance of adopting the notion of coordinating domains for an analysis that dissects the intricate interplay of empathy and moral judgments in social reasoning studies.

In the following sections of this article, I will analyze the definitions of empathy and related emotions, explore the relationship between empathy and altruism, and examine how empathy interacts with reasoning. I will also address issues related to theoretical formulations for studying emotions in moral judgments, with the goal of strengthening the theoretical foundations for empirical studies of empathy and reasoning.

1. Definitions of Empathy and Empathy-Related Emotions

In the field of psychology, researchers share broadly similar definitions of empathy, yet subtle differences emerge based on their specific emphases within the conceptual framework. This section contrasts the definitions of empathy proposed by two influential researchers, Hoffman and Eisenberg, and includes insights from another notable scholar on the subject, Batson.

1.1. Empathy, Sympathy, and Empathic Concern

Hoffman's definition of empathy as "an affective response more appropriate to another's situation"¹¹⁾ underscores its unique feature of closely aligning emotional reactions with the experiences of others. This results in a vicarious sharing of emotional states, which distinguishes it from the emotional contagion observed in infants. Hoffman emphasizes the other-centeredness that directs empathic feelings toward the conditions of another person, transcending self-centered considerations.

Eisenberg defined empathy as "an affective response that stems from the

11) Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development*, 4.

apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel.”¹²⁾ Unlike Hoffman, Eisenberg argues that pure empathy doesn't necessarily involve concern for the other person's welfare, focusing on mirroring emotional responses without linking them to compassionate or altruistic motivations. Eisenberg also introduces the concept of sympathy, which is distinct from empathy. Sympathy involves feeling sadness or concern for someone in distress and does not necessarily mirror the emotions experienced by the other person.¹³⁾

Batson's theory introduces the concept of empathic concern, which is defined as “other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need.”¹⁴⁾ Empathic concern encompasses a variety of emotions, such as compassion, tenderness, sadness, concern, and sympathy, which form an aggregate of empathic emotional tones and states in social relationships. While Batson's definition blurs the distinction between empathy and other feelings related to another's pain, it incorporates Hoffman's concept of empathy and Eisenberg's concept of sympathy, facilitating a comprehensive understanding of emotional empathic responses that evoke altruistic motivations and prosocial behaviors.

Comparing Eisenberg's and Hoffman's theories, Eisenberg's concept of sympathy is consistent with Hoffman's ideas of empathy. Although Hoffman does not explicitly distinguish between sympathy and empathy, his concept of empathy focuses on genuine concern for another's well-being, similar to Eisenberg's sympathy. For a more robust theoretical formulation, however, certain differences between their perspectives need to be clarified. Eisenberg considers the affective congruence between two or more persons in the experience of empathy to be part of empathy, whereas Hoffman does not.

12) Nancy Eisenberg, “Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 51, no. 1 (2000): 671, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665>.

13) Nancy Eisenberg, Natalie D. Eggum, and Laura Di Giunta, “Empathy-Related Responding: Associations with Prosocial Behavior, Aggression, and Intergroup Relations,” *Social Issues and Policy Review* 4, no. 1 (2010): 146, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2010.01020.x>.

14) C. Daniel Batson, *Altruism in Humans* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 11.

Moreover, Eisenberg's empathy may seem morally irrelevant because, unlike sympathy, it does not involve concern for others in pain.

Regarding the inclusion of emotional similarity in the definition of empathy, Batson suggests that the observer's emotion must match the victim's state in the experience of empathic concern.¹⁵⁾ This congruence does not imply an exact emotional match, but rather a shared valence of emotion. In empathic experiences, one may feel compassion when perceiving another person's negative well-being and joy when perceiving positive well-being. For example, witnessing someone experiencing intense shame can evoke feelings of sadness without directly experiencing shame.

Turning to another issue, defining empathy as value-neutral raises concerns. Some researchers argue that empathy, as the understanding of another person's emotions without vicariously experiencing them, can serve as the basis for both sympathy and schadenfreude (feeling pleasure while watching another person suffer).¹⁶⁾¹⁷⁾ This perspective is problematic because the psychological basis of schadenfreude is better explained by cognitive empathy, which is distinct from general empathy. Eisenberg defines cognitive empathy as the ability to understand the emotions and perspectives of others,¹⁸⁾ which distinguishes it from empathy and sympathy. Consequently, it is not valid to define empathy as simply reading another person's psychological state without considering the emotional valence involved.

In summary, empathy is the experience of the same or similar responses between two or more individuals. It is not a concept that inherently involves prosocial or altruistic motivations, but is an emotion that has the potential to develop into sympathy

15) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*.

16) Jutta Kienbaum, "The Development of Sympathy from 5 to 7 Years: Increase, Decline, or Stability? A Longitudinal Study," *Frontiers in Psychology* 5 (2014): 468, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00468>.

17) For a review of schadenfreude, refer to Mina Cikara, "Intergroup Schadenfreude: Motivating Participation in Collective Violence," *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 3 (2015): 12-17, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2014.12.007>; Rose Schindler et al., "Cause and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis," *PLoS ONE* 10, no. 10 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137669>.

18) Eisenberg, Eggum, and Di Giunta, "Empathy-Related Responding."

or compassion and is associated with moral behavior. This potential can arise from the sharing of emotional experiences, which serves as a foundational element for cooperation. Given Piaget's view that cooperation is an essential condition for the development of moral reasoning,¹⁹⁾ it is important to recognize the function of empathy in creating affective bonds and laying the foundation for cooperation for the common good.

1.2. Self-Centered Empathic Reactions

Eisenberg states that pure forms of empathy can lead to two contrasting emotional reactions: sympathy and personal distress. Personal distress is defined as “a self-focused, aversive, affective reaction to the apprehension of another's emotion (e.g., discomfort or anxiety), such as the distress of a person feeling anxious when viewing someone who is sad.”²⁰⁾ This emotional response arises from comprehending another person's distress, similar to sympathy. However, it remains self-centered, unlike the other-focused nature of sympathy. Consequently, empathy-related aversive emotions, such as personal distress, may not foster prosocial behaviors rooted in genuine concern for others.

Hoffman observed an emotional reaction and introduced the concept of empathic over-arousal, which signifies an intense feeling of distress from empathic experiences.²¹⁾ Empathic over-arousal does not carry any moral implications, but it can divert observers' attention from the victim's pain to their own psychological well-being when the distress becomes exceptionally salient. Hoffman introduced the term ‘egoistic drift’ to describe observers' tendency to distance themselves from the victim's pain due to their self-focused empathic process.²²⁾ This phenomenon involves observers experiencing intense aversive emotions from the victim's plight, which hinders them from being

19) Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (London: Routledge, 1932).

20) Eisenberg, “Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development,” 672.

21) Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development*.

22) Hoffman, 59.

other-centered and genuinely altruistic.

According to Batson, personal distress involves self-centered sensations such as agitation, alertness, unease, and discomfort.²³⁾ After analyzing several empirical studies, he concluded that empathic concern and personal distress are distinct emotions that arise from similar situations of need. Each emotional response has a spectrum, ranging from subtle to intense, and is linked to distinct motivations-altruistic and egoistic, respectively.²⁴⁾ While these motivations may sometimes align more or less harmoniously, they can also clash with each other. Personal distress, unlike empathic concern, is not commonly associated with altruistic acts but rather stems from a desire to alleviate one's discomfort. Therefore, helping behaviors are only correlated with personal distress when effectively relieving one's aversive emotions.

A review of theories and research on empathic reactions reveals distinct differences between sympathy and personal distress in attention, motivation, and behavior. Sympathy focuses on others in pain, promoting a philanthropic motive, while personal distress centers on the observer, emphasizing personal safety. Sympathy is associated with prosocial behaviors, whereas personal distress is linked to self-preservation. Despite both being painful, sympathy is gentle and warm, in contrast to the aversive nature of personal distress. This highlights the significant role that respectful emotions play in shaping moral values.²⁵⁾ It is important to note, however, that sympathy and personal distress can coexist in the same individual under specific conditions, requiring the coordination of diverse thoughts and feelings in decision-making.

2. Empathy and Altruism

This section explores empathy and altruism, with a focus on Batson's

23) C. Daniel Batson, David Lishner, and Eric Stocks, "The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis," *The Oxford Handbook of Prosocial Behavior*, 2015, 65.

24) Batson, Lishner, and Stocks, 65.

25) Refer to Elliot Turiel, "Thought, Emotions, Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development."

empathy-altruism hypothesis. The hypothesis aims to illustrate genuine motivations for prosocial behaviors beyond self-interest by demonstrating how empathy serves as a driving force for altruism in human beings.

2.1. Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

Batson has developed his theory of altruism based on the empathy-altruism hypothesis: “Empathic concern produces altruistic motivation.”²⁶⁾ While it may seem obvious that empathy and altruism are closely connected and that empathy can promote altruism, some doubt this connection and reject the hypothesis. They argue that humans tend to perform good actions for others to gain psychological and social benefits for themselves in the short or long term. Batson and his colleagues formulated the empathy-altruism hypothesis and conducted experiments to prove that humans can help others with pure altruistic motivation. This hypothesis counters arguments against pure altruism.²⁷⁾

According to Batson, the term altruism in his studies refers to “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare.”²⁸⁾ By prioritizing the goal of increasing another’s welfare as the ultimate goal, it is emphasized that this goal cannot be used as a means to achieve other goals such as social recognition and fame. To comprehend the essence of altruism, it is crucial to distinguish it from acts of assistance or self-sacrifice. While many consider prosocial behaviors to be a part of altruism, Batson deals with altruism as a motivation rather than a behavior. The empathy-altruism hypothesis posits that empathic concerns, as emotions, invoke altruistic motivation and influence prosocial behaviors.

Batson differentiates his theory from the approach of evolutionary and social

26) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*, 11.

27) C. Daniel Batson et al., “Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61, no. 3 (1991): 413–26; Batson, Lishner, and Stocks, “The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis.”

28) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*, 20.

biologists who discuss altruism in terms of the reduction of an organism's fitness for the survival of its group or the transmission of genes to the next generation.²⁹⁾ He adopts the distinction between evolutionary altruism and psychological altruism, as suggested by Sober and Wilson.³⁰⁾ In evolutionary terms, a trait is considered altruistic if it sacrifices the actor's fitness for the benefit of others.³¹⁾ In a psychological context, human altruism is defined as a sincere concern for the welfare of others, which should be an intrinsic end rather than a means to an end. Unlike evolutionary altruism, psychological altruism can contribute to the well-being of both individuals involved, even when the actors do not explicitly intend it. The selfless care one person extends to another has the potential to enhance the lives of both individuals within the relationship.

The concept of psychological altruism has been challenged in academic circles by theories that diverge from it. For example, social biologist Wilson argued that human morality, including altruism, is genetically programmed to ensure the transmission of genes to the next human generation.³²⁾ This theory suggests that moral behaviors in humans are directly influenced by individual genes, leading to a form of genetic determinism in moral development. In contrast, Batson endorses psychological altruism and supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis. This hypothesis presents a framework for comprehending the distinctive characteristics of human beings that differentiate them from other species.

2.2. Proof for Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

To support the empathy-altruism hypothesis, Batson synthesized findings from

29) Refer to Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1975).

30) Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson, "Summary of: 'Unto Others - The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior,'" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7 (2000): 681.

31) Batson does not intend altruism to be a trait or disposition but a psychological state in a given situation. Batson, *Altruism in Humans*, 21.

32) Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

numerous experiments conducted by various researchers over many years.³³⁾ The feasibility of escaping from situations eliciting empathic concern is a crucial factor that influences behavioral variations, such as altruism and egoism. Participants were informed that not helping would either alleviate their stress from exposure to the victim's suffering (easy escape) or prolong it (difficult escape) to control the viability of escape.³⁴⁾ This condition allowed individuals driven by egoistic motives to find relief from emotional distress by helping someone or by escaping the situation. However, altruistic motivation, triggered by empathy, could only be actualized through direct assistance and not by escape.

Experiments showed that participants with low empathic concern were less willing to help when an easy escape was available, while those with high empathic concern consistently provided assistance, even when an escape was easily achievable.³⁵⁾ These results confirm the presence of an altruistic motive in individuals, which is independent of egoistic motives aimed at reducing observers' emotional stress.

Batson and his colleagues' experiment and analysis provide empirical support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The study suggests that altruistic motivation elicited through empathic concern can explain many human behaviors aimed at enhancing the welfare of others. These findings challenge the idea that all prosocial actions stem from selfish motives, and reveal genuine philanthropic concerns for others, devoid of personal interests. The role of empathy in fostering altruism confirms the unique and distinctive quality of humans as moral agents from a psychological perspective. This is without relying on the evolutionary analysis of seemingly altruistic behaviors in some animals.

33) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*; C. Refer to Daniel Batson et al., "Where Is the Altruism in the Altruistic Personality?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50, no. 1 (1986): 212-20, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.50.1.212>; Nancy Eisenberg, Heather McCreath, and Randall Ahn, "Vicarious Emotional Responsiveness and Prosocial Behavior: Their Interrelations in Young Children," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 14, no. 2 (1988): 298-311, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167288142008>.

34) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*, 112.

35) Batson, 112.

Although Batson's studies are significant, further exploration of the connection between empathy and altruism is necessary. Batson's empathic concern schema includes sympathy and compassion, which may blur the distinction not only between empathy and compassion³⁶⁾ but also between compassion and altruism. However, Eisenberg and her colleagues differentiate not only empathy from sympathy but also sympathy from compassion. According to their perspective, both sympathy and compassion involve concerns for others. Compassion and sympathy are often used interchangeably, but compassion encompasses a broader range of emotions, such as caring and tenderness, along with a desire to assist, which is not inherent in the conceptualization of sympathy.³⁷⁾ Therefore, compassion is more likely to include a motivation to help others in pain, aligning with Batson's view of altruism as a motivation. Although it is acceptable to categorize compassion as an emotion and altruism as a motivation, the distinction between them remains unclear. Therefore, it is important to examine the connection between emotion and motivation in the context of moral judgments and prosocial behaviors.

3. Empathy and Cognition

Piaget proposed that human reasoning and judgments are inherently linked with emotions and motivations, making it impossible to isolate behaviors based solely on feelings or cognitions.³⁸⁾ In moral decision-making, whether profound or immediate, reasoning becomes essential for interpreting incidents or problems and assessing the

36) A distinction between empathy and compassion is commonly accepted. To review a study on compassion, refer to Jeong Yeon Hwang, Thomas Plante, and Katy Lackey, "The Development of the Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale: An Abbreviation of Sprecher and Fehr's Compassionate Love Scale," *Pastoral Psychology* 56, no. 4 (2008): 421-28, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11089-008-0117-2>.

37) Tracy L. Spinrad, Nancy Eisenberg, and Amanda Sheffield Morris, "Empathy-Related Responding in Children," in *Handbook of Moral Development*, ed. M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 3rd ed. (New York London: Routledge, 2022), 255-71.

38) Piaget, *Intelligence and Affect: Their Relationship during Child Development*.

implications of various courses of action. This section explores research on empathy and altruism, focusing on cognitive components such as moral reasoning and perspective-taking.

3.1. Empathy-Related Reasoning

Hoffman suggests that infants develop a positive correlation between empathy and prosocial behavior when they can differentiate themselves from others. This highlights the importance of cognitive components in early empathic reactions.³⁹⁾ Furthermore, Nichols and her colleagues found a positive association between children's level of social reasoning and their empathic concern for a distressed peer.⁴⁰⁾ It is crucial for children to comprehend how their peers feel, distinguish their own situations, and understand how they can provide help and solace to peers in distress. The development of social reasoning in peer interactions is logically and empirically linked to the emergence of empathy and prosocial behavior in children.

Eisenberg and her colleagues examine different types of prosocial moral reasoning and their connections with distinct vicarious emotions to explore the cognitive aspects of empathy development. The proposed reasoning types include hedonistic reasoning, needs-oriented reasoning, and other abstract and/or internalized types of reasoning (internalized reasoning).⁴¹⁾ Hedonistic reasoning is characterized by a self-centered focus on personal gain, while needs-oriented reasoning prioritizes the avoidance of harm and the fulfillment of various needs. Internalized reasoning involves a sense of duty to uphold laws and accepted norms or values, a concern for the rights of others, and an orientation towards generalized reciprocity for the benefit of society.

39) Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development*.

40) Sara R. Nichols, Margarita Svetlova, and Celia A. Brownell, "The Role of Social Understanding and Empathic Disposition in Young Children's Responsiveness to Distress in Parents and Peers," *Cognition, Brain, Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 13, no. 4 (2009): 449-78.

41) To explore various prosocial moral reasoning categories, refer to Nancy Eisenberg, "The Development of Reasoning Regarding Prosocial Behavior," in *The Development of Prosocial Behavior*, ed. N. Eisenberg (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1982), 232-33.

In terms of maturity, the least developmentally mature judgment is identified as hedonistic reasoning, followed by needs-oriented reasoning. The highest level of reasoning occurs when assessments are grounded in internalized values, norms, or responsibilities. As individuals age, their reasoning abilities progress through various stages, including role-taking, internalization of norms, rules, and values, internalized affective reactions driven by concerns about the consequences of their actions on others, and positive emotional responses linked to values and the commitment to uphold them.⁴²⁾ This developmental progression continues into late adolescence. Although the use of less mature reasoning types decreases with age, even adults may sometimes resort to childhood modes of reasoning, especially when justifying decisions not to help someone in need.⁴³⁾

When examining empathy and reasoning, two key considerations arise. Firstly, there is a need for a more precise delineation of the nature of prosocial moral reasoning. The study revealed issues with hedonistic reasoning, showing its negative association with empathy and prosocial behavior. It is worth noting that hedonistic reasoning was positively correlated with children's joyful emotional responses to a distressed peer.⁴⁴⁾ Therefore, hedonistic reasoning cannot be considered truly moral or prosocial, as it lacks a strong connection to genuine concern for others and is not firmly grounded in the principles of justice and human rights.

The study suggests that young adults may exhibit less mature reasoning in certain situations when it comes to prosocial moral reasoning. This observation challenges the conventional belief that moral judgments evolve through an unchanging sequence of stages, as proposed in Kohlberg's moral development theory.⁴⁵⁾

42) Nancy Eisenberg et al., "The Development of Prosocial Moral Reasoning and a Prosocial Orientation in Young Adulthood: Concurrent and Longitudinal Correlates," *Developmental Psychology* 50, no. 1 (2014): 58-70, <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032990>.

43) Eisenberg, "The Development of Reasoning Regarding Prosocial Behavior."

44) N. Eisenberg and R. A. Fabes, "Prosocial Behavior," in *Social, Emotional and Personality Development: Vol.3. Handbook of Child Psychology*, ed. W. Damon and N. Eisenberg, 5th ed. (New York: Wiley, 1998), 701-78.

45) Eisenberg, "The Development of Reasoning Regarding Prosocial Behavior."

3.2. Cognitive Antecedents of Empathy

Batson and his colleagues have made significant contributions to the study of moral judgments and social behaviors by exploring cognitive factors associated with empathy. They delve into empathic concern, examining its intricate relationship with cognitive capacities such as perception, evaluation, and perspective-taking.⁴⁶⁾ This work enhances our understanding of how empathy and reasoning intersect, complementing insights from Eisenberg's studies.

The team proposes three cognitive antecedents that elicit empathic concern: perceiving the other as in need, valuing the other's welfare, and adopting the other's perspective.⁴⁷⁾ The findings emphasize that perceiving someone as in need and adopting their perspective independently contribute to eliciting empathic concern. It is noteworthy that individuals can develop empathic concerns based solely on perception, without necessarily engaging in perspective-taking.

Additionally, Batson's team examines the impact of valuing the welfare of another person in need. Their results demonstrate a positive correlation between valuing others' welfare, engaging in perspective-taking, and providing assistance.⁴⁸⁾ The research suggests that individuals who genuinely value the well-being of others are more likely to adopt their perspectives and offer assistance. The study demonstrates that empathy and helping behaviors involve more than just simplistic emotional experiences. Instead, this research emphasizes the significant role of objective cognitive processes that consider the welfare and needs of others. It provides a nuanced understanding of the complex interplay between cognitive factors and empathic responses in moral judgments and social behaviors.

In conclusion, Batson and his colleagues offer valuable insights into moral reasoning

46) C. Daniel Batson et al., "An Additional Antecedent of Empathic Concern: Valuing the Welfare of the Person in Need," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93, no. 1 (2007): 65-74, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.65>.

47) Batson et al.

48) Batson et al.

by highlighting the significant interplay between cognition and emotion in moral judgment and behavior. It also highlights the various cognitive forms associated with helping behavior and cautions against overemphasizing perspective-taking. Piaget's approach considered perspective-taking as one of the cognitive abilities in the concrete operational period (approximately 6 to 11 years of age), deemed necessary for advancing to moral behavior based on autonomous judgment.⁴⁹⁾ However, Turiel and colleagues found that children make moral judgments autonomously even before reaching this cognitive stage.⁵⁰⁾ Therefore, it is necessary to further our comprehension of the function of perspective-taking. In this regard, Batson's discoveries are especially relevant.

4. Theoretical Formulations for the Study on Emotions in Moral Judgments

According to Turiel, "the relationships among emotions, moral judgments, reflections, and deliberations require a great deal of attention in research and in theoretical formulations."⁵¹⁾ Improving the theoretical foundations of studies is crucial when designing research projects and interpreting empirical study results on empathy and morality. It is essential to comprehensively examine diverse approaches to fortify the theoretical underpinnings of such studies.

4.1. Relationship between Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgments

Prominent scholars in the field of empathy studies, such as Hoffman, Eisenberg, and Batson, have developed a theoretical framework that defines morality by incorporating

49) Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*; Jean Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1952).

50) Smetana, "Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistency and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgements."

51) Elliot Turiel, "The Development of Morality," in *Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, Emotional and Personality Development*, ed. W. Damon and N. Eisenberg, vol. 3 (New York, NY: Wiley, 2006), 789-857.

emotional, cognitive, and motivational components.⁵²⁾ They provide a balanced perspective on the examination of moral judgments and prosocial behaviors by reviewing empathic feelings, moral reasoning, and altruistic motivations. It is unproductive and illogical to debate whether empathy is more important than moral reasoning or vice versa. However, some scholars in psychology and neuroscience, such as Greene et al. and Haidt, have sparked a debate on the primacy of emotions in moral judgments.⁵³⁾ They suggest that aversive emotional reactions, rather than moral reasoning, are the main driving force behind moral decisions.

Greene et al. conducted a study where participants were presented with moral dilemmas. For instance, the researchers presented a scenario in which a trolley was heading towards five people on a track. The only way to prevent the tragedy was to push a stranger off a footbridge, resulting in certain death for the stranger.⁵⁴⁾ The study found that participants were more likely to let the five individuals perish due to strong negative emotional reactions associated with pushing the stranger. However, some researchers have questioned the validity of this study due to theoretical shortcomings, both implicit and explicit.⁵⁵⁾

Above all, the division between emotion and cognition in classifying decisions as emotional or rational is considered unrealistic. Human decisions inherently incorporate both affective and intellectual aspects, each playing distinct roles while maintaining an inseparable connection. Piaget compared the relationship between emotion and cognition to a vehicle's fuel and engine, highlighting their interdependence in human behavior.⁵⁶⁾

52) Hoffman, *Empathy and Moral Development*; Eisenberg et al., "The Development of Prosocial Moral Reasoning and a Prosocial Orientation in Young Adulthood"; Batson, *Altruism in Humans*.

53) Greene et al., "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment"; Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail."

54) Greene et al., "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment."

55) Refer to Jonathan McGuire et al., "A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45, no. 3 (2009): 577-80, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.002>; Elliot Turiel, "The Relevance of Moral Epistemology and Psychology for Neuroscience," in *Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience*, ed. P. D. Zelazo, M. Chandler, and E. Crone, The Jean Piaget Symposium Series (New York, NY US: Psychology Press, 2010), 313-31.

Emotion acts as a motivating force, propelling intellectual activities,⁵⁷⁾ while intelligence constructs cognitive frameworks for coherent mental operations. It is not logical to dichotomize decision-making as emotional or rational since it separates emotions from cognition.

Moreover, it is contended that considering aversive emotions, such as anxiety, fear, or disgust, as the main factors affecting moral judgments is inaccurate. Research on empathy emphasizes the crucial role of positive emotions in moral reasoning and prosocial conduct. Morally significant emotions such as sympathy and empathic concern, rather than aversive emotions like personal distress, have a direct impact on moral behaviors.⁵⁸⁾ As summarized by Turiel, positive emotions are commonly associated with moral judgments in the moral reasoning of children and adolescents.⁵⁹⁾

4.2. Definition of Morality in Studies on Empathy

Batson presents a thought-provoking argument regarding whether behaviors driven by altruism should be universally considered moral. He states, “altruistic motivation as I have defined it can produce behavior that, depending on the moral standard applied, is moral, amoral, or immoral.”⁶⁰⁾ This raises the question: what circumstances might cause individuals to view actions prompted by altruism as immoral?

One possible scenario is when individuals are motivated by altruism to assist others in a way that goes against societal norms. This situation is particularly relevant when cultural norms prohibit certain forms of aid, even if those providing assistance believe

56) Jean Piaget, “Moral Feelings and Judgment,” in *The Essential Piaget: An Interpretive Reference and Guide*, ed. H. E. Gruber and J. J. Voneche (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1966), 154–58.

57) Piaget did not separate motivation from emotion, viewing both as energetic forces in human operations. Refer to Piaget, *Intelligence and Affect: Their Relationship during Child Development*.

58) Batson et al., “Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis”; Eisenberg and Fabes, “Prosocial Behavior.”

59) Turiel, “Thought, Emotions, Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development.”

60) C. Daniel Batson, “Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation,” in *Prosocial Motives, Emotions, and Behavior: The Better Angels of Our Nature*, ed. M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2010), 17.

their actions are in line with universal moral principles, such as fairness. Furthermore, in a framework where morality is equated with adherence to societal ethical standards, assisting someone in need in defiance of established norms may be deemed immoral, regardless of the nature of the aid. This paradoxical concept of ‘immoral behavior motivated by altruism’ may persist as long as external ethical or legal standards are the only basis for moral judgments.

It is important to acknowledge that morality extends beyond established laws and is based on reasoning related to well-being, justice, and rights.⁶¹⁾ Turiel explains the features of moral reasoning through an analysis of ethical theories and empirical studies. He asserts that moral judgments are independent of laws or authority and have universal applicability.⁶²⁾ This perspective promotes positive changes in laws and regulations to align with and promote human welfare and freedom. It frees morality from the constraints of established norms, allowing for a more open and inclusive society.

In most cases, the framework for moral development internalization is related to the externalization of moral references. The moral development of children is based on their internalization and observation of social norms established by adults. Hoffman and Eisenberg recognize the significance of internalization, which encompasses not only laws and regulations but also moral emotions and principles. Their perspective is broad and inclusive, rather than narrow. However, it is important to address the limitations of this framework.

The internalization perspective assumes a significant difference in moral judgment processes between adults and children. Kohlberg’s theory, while not emphasizing internalization, shares the foundational assumption of substantial differences between adults and children. According to Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development, adults

61) Turiel, *The Development of Social Knowledge*; Jeong Yeon Hwang, “Judgments on Exclusion of a Biracial Peer in Korea,” *Theology and Philosophy* 23 (2013): 213–54, <https://doi.org/10.16936/theoph.23.23.201311.213>.

62) Turiel, *The Development of Social Knowledge*.

may reach the stage where they can make autonomous judgments based on universal moral principles.⁶³⁾ However, Kohlberg's approach contends that children below the age of approximately 13, who have not yet reached the formal operational stage of cognitive development,⁶⁴⁾ are considered incapable of engaging in judgments based on abstract principles. Instead, children rely on acquired information from authority figures, such as teachers, or make judgments solely to avoid punishment or gain rewards, lacking genuine moral motivation.

However, studies using a social domain approach have challenged the idea that moral development occurs in parallel with intellectual capacity. Preschool children, for example, are capable of making moral judgments, especially in situations involving welfare concerns, such as physical harm resulting from aggressive actions. These moral judgments persist even when school regulations or parental directives propose an opposing viewpoint.⁶⁵⁾ Therefore, it is important to note that children's capacity for moral reasoning is not significantly limited, as suggested by Kohlberg's theory or presupposed by the internalization approach. In conclusion, psychologists should adopt an approach that can clarify how children develop their capacity for independent moral judgments. This approach should go beyond a legalistic view of morality, which equates morality with the observation of laws, and an internalization framework of moral development in childhood.

4.3. Coordination of Domains in Decision-Making for Prosocial Actions

To fully comprehend the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior, it is crucial to acknowledge the complexity involved in making judgments to assist others in

63) Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Development Approach to Socialization," in *Handbook of Socialization Theory*, ed. D. A. Goslin (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1969), 347-480.

64) Refer to Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children*.

65) Smetana, "Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistency and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgements."

real-life situations. Although many studies confirm the positive correlation between empathy and helping, it is important to note that experiencing an emotion does not necessarily result in helping or generate altruistic behavior. In other words, the positive associations between empathy and prosocial behavior identified by Eisenberg and her colleagues do not imply causation.⁶⁶⁾

Similarly, Batson suggests that empathic concern increases the likelihood of helping others in need. However, he acknowledges that helping behaviors may also be motivated by egoistic motives, such as seeking psychological and social rewards or avoiding punishments.⁶⁷⁾ Additionally, certain conditions increase the likelihood of providing assistance. If an individual is motivated by altruism, possesses the ability to aid someone in distress, is aware that no one else can extend this help, and the associated cost of assistance is manageable, there is a strong likelihood that the person will offer support.⁶⁸⁾

Examining how an individual's empathic concern translates into prosocial action is a complex process. To systematically understand the decision-making process related to prosocial behaviors, researchers may employ the concept of coordinating domains in social reasoning. A social domain approach explores how individuals integrate different domains of reasoning when facing complex events. The coordination of domains requires evaluating the importance of various concerns from different domains and making judgments based on the perceived significance of specific aspects over others.⁶⁹⁾

In real-life situations, conflicts may arise from diverse concerns within the moral domain, independent of personal or selfish considerations. For example, consider an individual who is deciding between volunteering at a children's hospital or participating in community outreach programs to support lonely older people. Additionally, some

66) Nancy Eisenberg, Tracy L. Spinrad, and Ariel Knafo-Noam, "Prosocial Development," in *Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science: Socioemotional Processes*, Vol. 3, ed. M. E. Lamb and R. M. Lerner (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2015), 610-56.

67) Batson, *Altruism in Humans*.

68) Batson.

69) Turiel, "Moral Judgments and Actions: Development and Processes of Coordination."

individuals may prioritize non-moral feelings and judgments over moral judgments based on empathic concerns. In situations such as high school volleyball team selections, where players may be excluded despite their desires and potential psychological harm due to inadequate skills, this decision may not necessarily be considered immoral or selfish when taking into account the limitations of individuals and circumstances.⁷⁰⁾ Researchers utilizing a social domain perspective have conducted analyses that provide useful insights for studies on empathy and prosocial behavior. This approach contributes to systematic and effective research design and result analysis.

Conclusion

Empathy holds a central role in shaping social relations and human morality. While scholars such as Hoffman, Eisenberg, and Batson have made significant contributions to empathy studies, there is still ample room for exploration. Given the substantial challenge posed by the intricate interplay between emotion and reason in the realm of moral judgments and prosocial behaviors, a comprehensive understanding requires robust theoretical foundations.

To enhance our understanding of empathy in real-life situations, it is important to strengthen the theoretical framework of empirical studies. Unlike controlled experimental conditions that enable the isolation of variables, actual scenarios are multifaceted and introduce diverse aspects. For example, even people who genuinely feel empathy for others in distress may choose not to engage in helpful behaviors due to various limitations and competing concerns. Interestingly, individuals with the least altruistic motives may still exhibit acts of kindness. Similarly, instances of greenwashing demonstrate how companies engaged in environmentally harmful practices may attempt to mitigate their unethical decisions by promoting charitable initiatives, creating a false

70) Refer to Hwang, "Judgments on Exclusion of a Biracial Peer in Korea."

impression of environmental responsibility.⁷¹⁾

In this diverse society, it is too simplistic to conclude that particular emotions or motives solely determine individual judgments. Therefore, research on morally relevant emotions, such as empathy, should follow a scientific approach that precisely captures the relationship between emotional and cognitive aspects of human behavior. Furthermore, it is essential to establish a definition of morality grounded in empirical evidence and sound philosophy when studying the relationship between empathy and moral judgments. This guarantees accurate interpretation of empathy research results and their application to other studies on morality.

Additionally, the coordination of domains serves as a valuable analytical tool for unraveling complex real-life decisions. Scholars can analyze the alignment or conflict between moral and non-moral considerations by categorizing diverse concerns and thoughts based on their content and structure. This approach sheds light on the dynamics that influence decision outcomes in particular situations. This contribution aims to enhance the theoretical foundation and foster a more precise and nuanced comprehension of the inherent complexities in the interplay between empathy, moral judgments, and prosocial behaviors.

71) Refer to Sebastião Vieira de Freitas Netto et al., "Concepts and Forms of Greenwashing: A Systematic Review," *Environmental Sciences Europe* 32, no. 1 (2020): 19, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-020-0300-3>.

참고문헌

- Batson, C. Daniel., J. G. Batson, J. K. Slingsby, K. L. Harrell, H. M. Peekna, and R. M. Todd. "Empathic Joy and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 61, no. 3 (1991): 413-26.
- Batson, C. Daniel. *Altruism in Humans*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Batson, C. Daniel. "Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation." In *Prosocial Motives, Emotions, and Behavior: The Better Angels of Our Nature*, edited by M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver, 15-34. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2010.
- Batson, C. Daniel, Michelle H. Bolen, Julie A. Cross, and Helen E. Neuringer-Benefiel. "Where Is the Altruism in the Altruistic Personality?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50, no. 1 (1986): 212-20. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.50.1.212>.
- Batson, C. Daniel, Jakob Håansson Eklund, Valerie L. Chermok, Jennifer L. Hoyt, and Biaggio G. Ortiz. "An Additional Antecedent of Empathic Concern: Valuing the Welfare of the Person in Need." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93, no. 1 (2007): 65-74. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.65>.
- Batson, C. Daniel., David Lishner, and Eric Stocks. "The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis." *The Oxford Handbook of Prosocial Behavior*, 2015, 259-81.
- Cikara, Mina. "Intergroup Schadenfreude: Motivating Participation in Collective Violence." *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 3 (2015): 12-17. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2014.12.007>.
- Eisenberg, N., and R. A. Fabes. "Prosocial Behavior." In *Social, Emotional and Personality Development: Vol. 3. Handbook of Child Psychology*, edited by W. W. Damon and N. Eisenberg, 5th ed., 701-78. New York, NY: Wiley, 1998.
- Eisenberg, Nancy., "The Development of Reasoning Regarding Prosocial Behavior." In *The Development of Prosocial Behavior*, edited by N. Eisenberg, 219-49. New York, NY: Academic Press, 1982.
- _____, "Emotion, Regulation, and Moral Development." *Annual Review of Psychology* 51, no.1 (2000): 665-97. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665>.

- Eisenberg, Nancy, Natalie D. Eggum, and Laura Di Giunta. "Empathy-Related Responding: Associations with Prosocial Behavior, Aggression, and Intergroup Relations." *Social Issues and Policy Review* 4, no. 1 (2010): 143–80. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2010.01020.x>.
- Eisenberg, Nancy, Claire Hofer, Michael J. Sulik, and Jeffrey Liew. "The Development of Prosocial Moral Reasoning and a Prosocial Orientation in Young Adulthood: Concurrent and Longitudinal Correlates." *Developmental Psychology* 50, no. 1 (2014): 58–70. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032990>.
- Eisenberg, Nancy, Heather McCreath, and Randall Ahn. "Vicarious Emotional Responsiveness and Prosocial Behavior: Their Interrelations in Young Children." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 14, no. 2 (1988): 298–311. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167288142008>.
- Eisenberg, Nancy, Tracy L. Spinrad, and Ariel Knafo-Noam. "Prosocial Development." In *Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science: Socioemotional Processes*, Vol. 3, edited by M. E. Lamb and R. M. Lerner, 610–56. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2015.
- Freitas Netto, Sebastião Vieira de, Marcos Felipe Falcão Sobral, Ana Regina Bezerra Ribeiro, and Gleibson Robert da Luz Soares. "Concepts and Forms of Greenwashing: A Systematic Review." *Environmental Sciences Europe* 32, no. 1 (2020): 19. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12302-020-0300-3>.
- Greene, Joshua D., R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley, and Jonathan D. Cohen. "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment." *Science* 293, no. 5537 (2001): 2105–8.
- Haidt, Jonathan. "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." *Psychological Review* 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–34. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814>.
- Hoffman, Martin L. *Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Hwang, Jeong Yeon, "Judgments on Exclusion of a Biracial Peer in Korea." *Theology and Philosophy* 23 (2013): 213–54. <https://doi.org/10.16936/theoph.23.23.201311.213>.

- _____. How Do Humans Become Moral? *Social Domain Approach to Moral Development*. Amazon Kindle Direct Publishing, 2021.
- Hwang, Jeong Yeon, Thomas Plante, and Katy Lackey. "The Development of the Santa Clara Brief Compassion Scale: An Abbreviation of Sprecher and Fehr's Compassionate Love Scale." *Pastoral Psychology* 56, no. 4 (2008): 421-28. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11089-008-0117-2>.
- Kienbaum, Jutta. "The Development of Sympathy from 5 to 7 Years: Increase, Decline, or Stability? A Longitudinal Study." *Frontiers in Psychology* 5 (2014): 468. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00468>.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Development Approach to Socialization." In *Handbook of Socialization Theory*, edited by D. A. Goslin, 347-480. Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1969.
- McGuire, Jonathan, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart, and Catriona Mackenzie. "A Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45, no. 3 (2009): 577-80. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.002>.
- Nichols, Sara R., Margarita Svetlova, and Celia A. Brownell. "The Role of Social Understanding and Empathic Disposition in Young Children's Responsiveness to Distress in Parents and Peers." *Cognition, Brain, Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 13, no. 4 (2009): 449-78.
- Piaget, Jean, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*. London: Routledge, 1932.
- _____. *The Origins of Intelligence in Children*. New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1952.
- _____. "Moral Feelings and Judgment." In *The Essential Piaget: An Interpretive Reference and Guide*, edited by H. E. Gruber and J. J. Voneche, 154-58. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1966.
- _____. *Intelligence and Affect: Their Relationship during Child Development*. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 1981.
- Schindler, Rose, André Körner, Sylvia Bauer, Sarina Hadji, and Udo Rudolph. "Causes and Consequences of Schadenfreude and Sympathy: A Developmental Analysis." *PLoS ONE* 10, no. 10 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0137669>.

- Smetana, J. G. "Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistency and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgements." In *Handbook of Moral Development*, edited by M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 119-53. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006.
- Sober, Elliott, and David Sloan Wilson. "Summary of: 'Unto Others - The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior.'" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7 (2000):185-206.
- Spinrad, Tracy L., Nancy Eisenberg, and Amanda Sheffield Morris. "Empathy-Related Responding in Children." In *Handbook of Moral Development*, edited by M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 3rd ed., 255-71. New York London: Routledge, 2022.
- Turiel, Elliot., *The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- _____. "The Development of Morality." In *Handbook of Child Psychology: Social, Emotional and Personality Development*, edited by W. Damon and N. Eisenberg, 3:789-857. New York, NY: Wiley, 2006.
- _____. "Thought, Emotions, Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development." In *Handbook of Moral Development*, edited by M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 7-35. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2006.
- _____. "The Relevance of Moral Epistemology and Psychology for Neuroscience." In *Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience.*, edited by P. D. Zelazo, M. Chandler, and E. Crone, 313-31. The Jean Piaget Symposium Series. New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2010.
- _____. "Moral Judgments and Actions: Development and Processes of Coordination." In *Handbook of Moral Development*, edited by M. Killen and J. G. Smetana, 3rd ed., 3-18. New York London: Routledge, 2022.
- Wilson, Edward O. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1975.
- _____. *On Human Nature*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978.

사회 영역적 접근 방식을 통한 공감과 도덕적 추론의 상호 작용 고찰

황정연

본 연구는 사회영역적 접근 이론으로, 사회적 상호작용과 도덕적 추론에서 공감의 역할을 탐구한다. 분석에는 공감, 관련 감정, 공감-이타주의 관계 및 추론과의 연관성 검토가 포함된다. 감정-이성 이분법의 오류를 강조하면서 도덕성에 대한 과학적 접근 방식에서 인지적, 감정적, 동기적 요소의 실질적인 통합을 제시한다. 본 연구는 공감 연구에 대한 사회영역적 접근을 제안하고, 도덕적 발달에 있어 내면화의 한계를 분석한다. 어린이의 도덕적 판단 능력을 명확히 보여주는 경험적 발견은 이러한 접근 방식을 뒷받침한다. 또한 친사회적 행동을 위한 의사결정 과정을 조사하기 위해 사회적 추론에서 영역조정 개념을 소개한다. 이 방법을 통해 연구자들은 다양한 요인과 영역의 상호 작용을 조사하여 공감감과 도덕적 추론의 관계에 대한 이해도를 높일 수 있다.

주제어: 공감, 사회영역이론, 도덕적 판단, 친사회적 행동, 영역조정

Exploring the Interplay of Empathy and Moral Reasoning through a Social Domain Approach

Hwang, Jeong-Yeon

This study explores the role of empathy in social interactions and moral reasoning from the perspective of social domain theory. The analysis includes a review of empathy, related emotions, the empathy-altruism relationship, and its association with reasoning. It proposes a practical integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational elements in scientific approaches to morality, highlighting the flaws of the emotion-reason dichotomy. This study proposes a social domain approach to empathy research and analyzes the limitations of internalization in moral development. Empirical findings that clarify children's moral judgment capacity support this approach. The study also introduces the concept of coordinating domains in social reasoning to examine the decision-making process for prosocial actions. This method enables researchers to examine the interaction of various factors and domains, enhancing our understanding of the relationship between empathy and moral reasoning.

Key Words: Empathy, Social Domain Theory, Moral Judgments, Prosocial Behavior, domain coordination

논문 투고일	2024년 3월 10일
논문 수정일	2024년 4월 26일
논문게재 확정일	2024년 4월 24일
